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Tony Harland’s piece raises some challenging issues for ‘people who study 
higher education’ and, in particular, for those who read and write for Teaching 
in Higher Education. He finds himself questioning the identity of this 
community of readers and writers: their disciplinary origins, their field of 
enquiry and of the journal itself, the purposes it serves, and its inclusive 
orientation are all reflected upon. 
I welcome the opportunity for reflexive discussion which is opened up by 
Harland’s piece. Contributors to Teaching in Higher Education have not 
tended to write about their identity, unlike those of a related journal, IJAD 
(The International Journal of Academic Development). A third of the articles in 
the first four years of IJAD focused upon the role and identity of its 
contributors. Within limits, such introspection and reflexivity can be valuable.
Central to his thinking is his observation that the community of people who 
study higher education is diverse and that the ‘field’ lacks ‘epistemological 
precision’. His view seems to be that this is a major source of the problems he 
identifies. 
But I’m not sure that he should be unduly anxious about being unable to 
resolve such epistemological uncertainties. Universities typically have many 
departments that cannot readily be described in terms of one dominant 
discipline and are variously referred to as being multidisciplinary or 
interdisciplinary. And new academic journals are becoming increasingly 
interdisciplinary in their orientation. Even within well established disciplines, 
the nature of the discipline, and thus its epistemological basis, is often widely 
contested. And even where the discipline itself may not be so widely 
contested, a complex interplay between pure and applied subjects often 
makes epistemological distinctions obscure. In my own strongly research led 
institution, the academic staff in the department of mathematics, for example, 
includes 13 professors whose research interests, in addition to pure 
mathematical aspects, include ecology, engineering, the environment and 
fluid mechanics as well as interdisciplinary research with psychologists, 
biologists and economists. I very much doubt that there is a shared and 
precise basis to the epistemology underpinning their researches.
If Harland is assuming that a well founded discipline or disciplinary community 
is certain of, and precise about, its epistemological basis, it does not appear 
to be the case for many university departments, and would be even more 
unlikely for a journal which seeks to involve the range of contributions that is 
characteristic of Teaching in Higher Education.
The more important distinction, however, is not between those who are sure 
of their epistemological basis and those who are not, as between those who 
are concerned about the epistemology of their study and those who are not. 
At the risk of stereotyping, there is perhaps a tendency for those in the natural 
sciences to have other things to think about than the epistemological basis of 
their enquiries. The acceptance of (and certainty about) epistemological 
matters is characteristic of what Thomas Kuhn (1962) called ‘normal science’ 
(as opposed to science which is undergoing ‘revolutionary’ change). In the 
critical social sciences, however, the epistemological basis of claims to 
knowledge has been a major preoccupation of many. 
While a lack of concern for epistemology may indicate a degree of certainty, it 
does not indicate a degree of precision, or at least not a degree of rigour. On 
the contrary, there is every reason for supposing that those who have little 
interest in the epistemological basis of their research have little grounds for 
claiming that it is rigorous in regard to epistemology. It is odd to claim that one 
is rigorous or precise about something of which one is indifferent. The logical 
conclusion of such a view would be that the only firm basis for certainty is 
ignorance. That doesn’t seem to be a very good basis for any disciplined 
study. 
But I share Harland’s worry about ‘whether or not an inclusive higher 
education community’ of those who participate in Teaching in Higher 
Education ‘undermines its own disciplinary status’. On several occasions I 
have recommended an article from the journal to a colleague, who later tells 
me either that they did not understand it, or that after struggling to understand 
it they thought its message could have been communicated much more 
simply without ‘jargon’. Then when I question what exactly they took to be the 
message of the article, their account misses the subtlety of the message.  The 
criticism of ‘jargon’ is often levelled against articles from a broadly sociological 
frame of reference. But lack of comprehension is even more apparent when 
statistics are presented. The only difference is that the incomprehensibility of 
statistics is widely accepted by those who lack familiarity with its procedures, 
whereas sociological accounts of a society and its relations are presumed to 
be comprehensible to anyone who participates in that society. Either way, 
inclusivity is a value which is not easily realised. 
This seems to suggest a choice. Writers may concentrate on representing 
their ideas in ways which are readily accessible to others from any disciplinary 
base, and risk over simplification and lack of subtlety. Alternatively they may 
draw freely upon the insights of their discipline, and risk not being understood 
by those who lack familiarity with their discipline’s ideas and ways of 
representing them. The former choice risks reducing ideas to banality; the 
latter risks specialism, fragmentation and sectarianism. This is a particular 
difficulty for a journal, whose policy states that it aims ‘to develop a discourse 
of learning which transcends disciplinary boundaries and specialisms while 
drawing upon the rigour of a range of disciplines’ (see TiHE policy statement). 
Transcending disciplinary boundaries is no straightforward matter in principle 
or in practice. Gibbons et al (1994) claim that disciplinary knowledge is only of 
concern to academics, and is being increasingly superseded by ‘Mode 2’ 
problem oriented knowledge in which disciplinary boundaries are 
transcended. The kind of issues that Harland’s article raises, however, 
demonstrate that simply by focussing on a ‘problem’ (say, how best to support 
university students’ learning) we do not ‘transcend’ the difficulties of 
negotiating and communicating between the various disciplinary approaches 
that may be deployed in addressing the problem.
The difficulty here is not just one for those who participate in this journal or 
who enquire into educational matters. Nor is it confined to communities of 
academics involved in research. It is also a problem faced by students and 
those who teach in programmes of study that increasingly cross disciplinary 
and professional boundaries. ‘We’ (participants of this journal and HE 
teachers in general) need to get better at speaking and writing across these 
boundaries. 
When communities (of researchers, readers or students) and the boundaries 
between them are so fluid, the writer’s (or the teacher’s) sense of audience is 
particularly important. For Harland, the difficulties of identifying the audience 
are paramount. He appears to resolve this, however. He says ‘when I write, I 
do this with my university colleagues in mind’ acknowledging ‘that this view is 
not shared by other higher education researchers… (who) write for other 
researchers who have a similar interest’.
I think I’m one of these ‘others’. But I’m not sure, for it depends what is meant 
by similar  interest. And that takes us back to the beginning of Harland’s 
article. For ‘field uncertainty’ is primarily an uncertainty about the extent to 
which participants in the field have similar interests. This uncertainty is 
characteristic of anything I write for wider publication. For whom am I writing? 
Where do our interests overlap? How should I address them? Perhaps the 
desire for inclusiveness demands at least a moment’s reflection upon such 
questions.
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